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ABSTRACT	 EMBODIED	DISEASE:	FEMININITY,	DOMINATION,	AND	DE	SADE	 BY	JESSIKAH	DIAZ 
 This	thesis	offers	a	new	reading	of	a	libertine	tradition	that	is	continuously	producing	a	poetics	of	the	body,	organizing	itself	around	sexuality	and	disease.	Previous	scholarship	has	acknowledged	the	eighteenth-century	trope	of	the	diseased	and	sexualized	woman	as	an	effect	of	corruption,	an	effect	of	indulgence,	and	so	on.	However,	I	attend	to	the	diseased	woman	as	a	formation	by	and	through	the	material,	as	an	effect	of	disease.	I	ask:	what	does	it	mean	when	disease	becomes	a	vector	between	the	hyper-sexualized	female	form	and	Enlightenment	thought?	In	what	follows,	I	connect	the	physical	human	body	to	Enlightenment	philosophy	via	a	materialist	framework	that	compels	an	interdisciplinary	focus	on	organic	and	inorganic	embodiment.	Through	the	works	of	John	Wilmot,	the	Earl	of	Rochester,	Marquis	de	Sade,	and	William	Blake,	I	show	how	women	are	animated	by	the	physical	energy	of	disease.	Namely,	that	this	material	matter,	its	persistence	and	vitality,	becomes	a	way	for	women	to	participate	in	and	pass	along	a	form	of	violence	typically	enacted	against	them.	Ultimately,	by	tying	people	together	in	nonproductive	ways,	I	propose	that	venereal	disease	is	a	form	of	collective	power	that	challenges	Enlightenment	attitudes	about	progress	and	self-preservation.		
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Introduction	
	
The	essence	of	enlightenment	is	the	alternative	whose	ineradicability	is	that	of	domination.	
Men	have	always	had	to	choose	between	their	subjection	to	nature	or	the	subjection	of	nature	
to	the	Self.	—Max	Horkheimer	and	Theodor	W.	Adorno,	Dialectic	of	Enlightenment		What	does	it	mean	to	be	the	vector	of	disease?	To	resist	institutional	forms	of	chastity	while	contributing	to	public	forms	of	commerce?	To	embody	the	foreign	while	standing	for	the	failings	of	the	national?	To	contain	and	offer	life	while	transferring	death?	The	figure	of	the	eighteenth-century	harlot	is	both	revolutionary	and	destructive.	She	is	paradox,	generative	in	her	contradictions,	embodying	new	Enlightenment	attitudes	about	progress	and	self-preservation.	In	some	texts	she	suffers	and	in	others	she	prospers—always	sexualized	and	often	diseased.	
	 This	paper	is	not	interested	in	the	occupation	of	harlotry	so	much	as	it	uses	the	harlot	to	think	more	broadly	about	the	naturalized	implications	of	female	sexuality	and	the	hyper-sexualized	female	body.	I	begin	by	addressing	the	woman	as	an	organic	body	shaped	by	and	containing	matter,	a	formation	of	stuff	that	transfers	and	disperses	particles	in	its	interaction	with	other	bodies.	In	thinking	about	how	the	body	transports	and	exchanges	things,	I	am	also	interested	in	how	the	physical	human	form	becomes	a	template	or	model	for	other	material	and	immaterial	forms.	For	instance,	medical	treatises	of	the	period,	such	as	French	physician	Jean	Astruc’s	A	Treatise	of	Venereal	Disease,	use	materialism	to	characterize	the	epidemiology	of	disease,	often	referring	to	it	as	the	“communication”	of	matter.1	And	yet,	twentieth-century	theorists	such	as	Roland	Barthes	make	metaphorical	
                                               1	Jean	Astruc,	A	Treatise	of	Venereal	Disease,	139.  
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what	physicians	made	literal.	By	also	drawing	on	Lucretian	materialism,2	Barthes	uses	the	material	process⁠	of	Epicurean	physics,	to	provide	a	metaphor	for	the	dissemination	of	knowledge.3	Here,	we	find	a	figuration	of	philosophy	as	a	tangible	active	substance	that	is	transferred	from	body	to	body,	developing	and	forming	in	unforeseeable	combinations.		This	paper	takes	cues	from	both	the	abstract	and	the	literal	by	connecting	the	physical	human	body	to	Enlightenment	philosophy	via	a	materialist	framework	that	compels	an	interdisciplinary	focus	on	organic	and	inorganic	embodiment.	More	specifically,	I	confront	the	Enlightenment’s	recurring	trope	of	the	diseased	woman	as	a	postulation	of	the	sexualized	body	that	emerges	from	developments	in	natural	science	and	medicine.		I	begin	by	asking	how	epidemiological	understandings	of	disease	shape	literary	depictions	of	the	physical	human	body?	To	be	specific,	what	does	it	mean	when	disease	becomes	a	vector	between	the	hyper-sexualized	female	form	and	Enlightenment	thought?	
                                               
2 Lucretian	materialism	derives	from	Lucretius’	De	rerum	natura,	translated	as	“On	the	Nature	of	Things”	(1	BCE),	and	communicates	the	laws	of	Epicurean	physics.	This	pre-biological	perspective	of	the	material	world	suggests	that	all	organic	and	inorganic	processes	can	be	explained	through	the	interaction	and	formation	of	atomic	particles.	In	terms	of	this	paper,	it	is	important	to	remember	that	atoms	are	irreducible	and	active	particles	that	continue	to	develop	and	grow	our	material	reality,	not	once	but	constantly.	This	materialist	framework	considers	the	various	and	uncontainable	ways	that	physical	human	bodies	transfer	disease	and	how	disease	reshapes	the	material	body	across	time	and	space.		
3	Roland	Barthes,	Sade,	Fourier,	Loyola,	9.		
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In	what	follows,	I	examine	a	variety	of	works	from	the	Enlightenment	period	both	in	poetry	and	in	prose.	While	some	are	well	circulated	others	are	lesser	known,	and	they	are	all	threaded	together	by	the	perniciousness	of	venereal	disease.	Rather,	all	works	employ	the	figure	of	disease	in	order	to	make	particular	distinctions	about	the	female	body;	namely,	how	the	sexualized	female	body	is	leveraged	to	conform	to,	challenge,	or	resist	a	broader	social	subscription	to	natural	philosophy.	Julie	Peakman’s	Mighty	Lewd	Books	delineates	the	development	of	natural	philosophy	as	it	attempts	to	explain	pre-biological	theories	for	the	roles	of	male	and	female	in	reproduction.	Those	scientists	that	worked	against	the	ideological	heteronormative	grain,	such	as	William	Harvey	(1578-1657),	published	extensive	accounts	on	germination	that	give	primacy	to	the	female	in	reproduction.	His	book	De	Generatine	claims	that	there	are	plants	and	animals	that	reproduce	spontaneously	by	seeds	and	eggs	carried	by	the	wind.	By	advancing	a	view	of	reproductive	processes	that	centralized	the	functions	of	the	anatomical	female	body,	Harvey	offered	an	unpopular	image	of	impregnation	that	waives	any	need	for	a	male	counterpart.			In	response	to	natural	philosophers	like	Harvey,	there	emerged	new	scientific	works	that	sought	to	reestablish	the	important	role	of	males	in	reproduction.	New	findings	of	“eel-like	animals”	in	semen	and	potent	“spermatic	worms”	(spermatozoa)	inevitably	grounded	women	as	“mere	nourishers.”4	The	female	figure	soon	became	only	passively	productive.	A	body	to	be	drawn	from,	to	be	drained,	a	site	only	productive	in	its	submission	to	the	virile	male.		
                                               4	Julie	Peakman,	Mighty	Lewd	Books,	81-82.	
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In	support	of	this	male	driven	system	of	reproduction,	satirizers	such	as	John	Hill	(1716-1775)	use	pornographic	tropes	to	denounce	scientists	like	Harvey	and	declare	the	crucial	and	thus	obvious	role	of	men	in	reproduction:		The	only	Doubt	now	remaining	with	me	was,	whether	Animalcula	did	really	float	about	in	the	Air,	and	slide	down	the	Throat	as	he	described?	for	I	had	been	used	to	think	they	were	originally	lodged	in	the	Loins	of	Males	.	.	.	Here	again	I	was	at	a	Stand;	all	before	me	was	Darkness	and	Doubt;	I	knew	not	if	there	were	any	such	Animalcula,	or,	if	there	were,	I	supposed	them	too	small	to	be	discovered	by	the	naked	Eye;	and	though	perhaps	they	might	be	discernible	with	the	Help	of	a	Microscope,	yet	I	knew	not	where	to	seek	those	opportune	Place,	hinted	at	by	the	great	Metaphysician.5		The	process	of	reproduction	needs	no	further	inquiry,	for	males	are	more	instrumental	than	the	Metaphysician’s	microscope.	By	definition,	pornographic	fiction	denaturalizes	the	process	of	reproduction,	thus,	the	genre	provides	ample	opportunity	to	comment	on	the	limitations	of	the	natural	philosopher.	In	its	form,	it	trades	microscopes	for	members	and	animalcula	for	semen:	making	messy	what	science	makes	methodical.	This	paper	is	interested	in	the	way	erotic	poetics	directly	and	indirectly	remark	on	male-centric	conceptions	of	physiology	and	epidemiology,	often	challenging	any	notion	that	centers	the	male	in	the	process	of	reproduction.	This	project	explores	both	poetry	and	prose	but	orients	itself	toward	works	in	the	libertine	tradition,	broadly	construed.	Specifically,	it	acknowledges	libertinism	as	a	commitment	to	a	perspective	on	the	female	body	as	excessively	material	and	infinitely	available	to	men.			 We	often	view	the	libertine	as	a	promoter	of	excess	and	sexual	pleasure,	an	advocate	for	what	we	can	more	aptly	name	as	sexual	nonreproduction.	From	this	position,	there	is	no	merit	in	chastity,	for	there	is	no	value	in	marriage	as	a	moral	determination.	Additionally,	there	is	no	value	in	a	legitimate	right	to	inheritance	for	all	women	should	be	
                                               5	John	Hill,	Lucine	Sine	Concubitu,	9-10.	
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available	to	all	men.	These	rakish	works	encourage	immaterial	rights	to	women,	but	also	feverishly	degrade	the	physical	female	form	as	something	inferior	to	men.	By	harping	on	the	foulness	of	the	female	body,	lines	such	as	“her	belly	is	a	bag	of	turds,	/	And	her	cunt	a	common	shore”6	become	thematic	ways	to	think	about	the	materiality	of	the	female	figure,	as	revolting	and	yet	illimitable.		To	underwrite	this	argument,	the	female	body	is	not	made	foul:	it	is	naturally	foul.	A	woman’s	body	is	not	dirtied	through	its	continuous	contact	with	multiple	men;	in	fact,	even	venereal	disease	can	be	disavowed	from	whom	it	was	transmitted.	For	the	libertine,	there	is	a	naturalness	to	the	filth	of	the	female	body	that	aligns	the	material	threat	of	syphilis	with	the	material	threat	of	menstruation.	I	work	within	this	libertine	framework	in	order	to	press	on	how	the	female	body	is	framed	as	a	naturally	menacing	form,	and	in	what	ways	this	form	threatens	the	male-centric	process	of	sexual	nonreproduction.		In	order	to	properly	trace	a	libertine	pedigree,	this	paper	begins	by	exploring	poems	by	John	Wilmot,	the	Earl	of	Rochester	in	order	to	argue	that	disease	is	an	activation	of	the	normally	submissive	female	body,	an	unwelcome	aggression	leveraged	on	male	models	of	desire	and	action.	I	suggest	that	this	material	animation	shakes	awake	an	immaterial	consciousness	better	left	outside	the	fluxing	physical	circuit.	Rochester	not	only	introduces	us	to	the	disruptive	female	body	but	sets	us	up	to	imagine	the	material	as	a	form	of	power	independent	from	consciousness.		As	a	whole,	this	project	is	largely	preoccupied	by	Marquis	de	Sade’s	Philosophy	in	the	
Bedroom.	As	I	trace	the	pedigree	of	libertine	poetics,	it	is	Philosophy	that	anchors	my	observations	with	its	frank	vision	of	sexual	violence	as	a	political	and	philosophical	
                                               6	John	Wilmot,	the	Earl	of	Rochester,	“On	Mrs.	Willis”,	138.19-20.		
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metaphor.	Scholars	typically	read	Philosophy	for	Dolmance’s	speech,	“Yet	Another	Effort,	Frenchmen,	If	You	Would	Become	Republicans,”	and	during	the	eighteenth-century,	this	piece	was	siphoned	from	the	rest	of	the	text	and	popularly	circulated	as	its	own	pamphlet.		We	circumvent	the	rest	of	the	book	by	separating	the	pornographic	content	from	its	political	content,	when	in	actuality,	the	erotic	becomes	political	in	the	way	it	acts	out	the	embedded	friction	between	political	desire	and	philosophical	action.	The	pornographic	is	necessary	because	it	offers	a	performance	that	illuminates	the	irony	in	what	is	being	orated.	I	examine	the	text	as	a	whole	in	order	to	holistically	study	how	de	Sade	is	not	simply	promoting	libertinism	but	is	cautioning	against	the	period’s	complicity	in	a	broader	social	philosophy.	I	conclude	this	project	with	a	brief	reading	of	William	Blake’s	“London”,	a	poem	that	may	seem	to	be	out	of	place	here	but	is	actually	crucial	to	showing	a	still-developing	libertine	tradition.	I	suggest	that	“London”	is	a	space	where	the	echoes	of	material	abuse	direct	our	attention	to	the	egotistical	and	unguided	philosophy	of	domination.		“London”	provides	an	exemplary	picture	of	a	society	complicit	in	the	generational	transference	of	violence.	Although	the	field	may	not	normally	associate	William	Blake	with	trends	and	commitments	to	the	libertine,	I	hope	this	project	provides	a	new	reading	of	the	poem	that	posits	it	among	a	literary	ancestry	ordering	itself	through	sexuality	and	violence.		The	Enlightenment	unapologetically	thrusts	forward	this	didactic	figure	of	the	woman.	Works	ranging	by	content	and	medium,	from	Daniel	Defoe’s	Roxana:	The	Fortunate	Mistress	to	William	Hogarth’s	A	Harlot’s	Progress,	provoke	us	to	learn	something	from	the	sexualized	female	body.	Whether	we	learn	from	the	constraints	of	marriage	or	the	corruptions	of	the	nation,	it	seems	as	if	everything	and	everyone	has	a	hand	in	shaping	the	
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sexualized	woman.	And	yet,	what	seems	to	be	missing	is	an	exploration	as	to	why	this	figure	is	developed	and	codified	as	diseased.	Previous	scholarship	has	acknowledged	venereal	disease	as	an	effect	of	corruption,	an	effect	of	indulgence,	and	so	on.	Yet,	not	much	work	has	been	done	to	think	about	this	woman	as	the	inverse,	as	a	formation	by	and	through	the	material,	as	an	effect	of	disease.	Of	course,	this	paper	only	begins	to	scratch	the	surface	of	a	topic	that	is	as	expansive	and	dynamic	as	the	material	itself.	However,	I	hope	that	this	project	provides	an	interdisciplinary	way	of	reading	this	figure	as	not	simply	diseased	but	the	embodiment	of	disease.				 	
 12 
Sadeian	Sexuality	and	the	Enlightenment	
	
That	what	fools	call	humaneness	is	nothing	but	a	weakness	born	of	fear	and	egoism;	that	this	
chimerical	virtue,	enslaving	only	weak	men,	is	unknown	to	those	whose	character	is	formed	by	
stoicism,	courage,	and	philosophy.	—Marquis	de	Sade,	Philosophy	in	the	Bedroom	
	 Much	more	than	a	historical	period,	the	Enlightenment	was	a	philosophical	development	that	attempted	to	instill	virtue	in	lieu	of	religion	and	in	response	to	new	egalitarian	politics.	It	is	a	period	when	the	fundamental	structures	of	physical	existence	were	thrown	up	in	the	air	as	scientists	looked	for	a	new	theory	with	which	to	organize	life.	Whether	the	period	oriented	us	toward	progress	or	directed	us	toward	new	systems	of	inequality	is	still	up	for	debate;	however,	what	scholarship	does	prove,	is	that	the	Enlightenment	was	a	period	so	teeming	and	dynamic	with	possibility	that	we	continue	to	assess	its	impact	today.			What	developed	during	this	period	is	the	phenomenon	of	practical	reason,	a	form	of	thinking	that	is	defined	by	the	individual	and	shaped	by	impulse	or	drive.	Under	these	terms,	reason	cannot	be	mudded	by	old	ways	of	reasoning,	and	instead,	must	be	redefined	by	the	individual	who	remains	free	from	other	forces.	For	instance,	if	fear	and	enjoyment	are	always	in	response	to	something	“sinful”	or	“virtuous”,	then	it	is	up	to	reason	to	deduce	what	is	morally	“good”	or	“bad”	and	then	for	the	rational	person	to	guide	himself	by	his	own	natural	impulses.	That	is,	“when	the	objective	systematization	of	nature	has	been	disposed	of	as	prejudice	and	myth,	nature	remains	only	as	a	material	mass,”	and	so,	even	“thinking	becomes	an	organic	medium.”7	If	what	is	material	is	amoral	and	thus	natural,	
                                               7	Horkheimer	and	Adorno,	Dialectic	of	Enlightenment,	41.	
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then	the	natural	organization	of	life	gives	primacy	to	the	physical.	That	is,	there	is	no	strength	in	virtue,	only	strength	in	the	physical	potential	of	things,	consequently,	“self-preservation	[becomes]	the	constitutive	principle	of	science.”8		In	this	spirit,	Dolmancé,	the	leading	male	character	of	Marquis	de	Sade’s	Philosophy	
in	the	Bedroom,	denounces	any	form	of	universal	rule	for	it	is	a	“terrible	injustice	to	require	that	men	of	unlike	character	all	be	ruled	by	the	same	law.”9	And	to	underscore	this,	Dolmancé	argues	that	those	who	murder,	thieve,	or	commit	adultery	are	justified	in	their	actions,	as	nature	inspires	the	impulse	to	act,	and	provides	the	vigor	for	those	acts	to	succeed.	For	Dolmancé,	it	is	the	weak	who	circumvent	the	potential	of	the	strong	by	undermining	nature’s	law,	stifling	the	“energy	essential	to	republican	virtues.”10				 Thus,	if	we	are	to	subscribe	to	Dolmance’s	way	of	reasoning,	to	restrict	one’s	abilities	is	to	deny	what	is	particular	to	the	individual	and	thus	what	is	natural.	The	strong	and	the	capable	are	the	powerful,	and	are	privileged	for	their	natural	ability	to	overcome	what	is	weak.	And	yet,	as	Adorno	and	Horkheimer	use	de	Sade	to	point	out,	philosophy	fails	to	make	the	distinctions	necessary	to	resist	what	eventually	becomes	totalitarian.	The	individual—regardless	if	we	classify	by	person,	species,	or	state—becomes	a	representation	of	power.	Consequently,	the	ability	to	dominate	and	domination	itself	are	presented	as	part	of	a	natural	organization	of	life,	rather	than	harmful	to	life	itself.			 Although	the	politics	of	the	Enlightenment	sought	to	disperse	power	among	the	people,	this	gesture	quickly	fell	behind	a	privileging	of	the	individual.	In	Philosophy,	
                                               8	Horkheimer,	86.	
9 Marquis	de	Sade,	Philosophy	in	the	Bedroom,	310.	
10	De	Sade,	300.	
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Dolmance’s	monologue	“Yet	Another	Effort,	Frenchmen,	If	You	Would	Become	Republicans,”	alludes	to	the	disjunction	between	philosophical	thought	and	republican	virtue.	The	character	calls	attention	to	what	society	seems	to	ignore:	the	same	philosophies	that	motivated	the	French	Revolution	cannot	harmoniously	live	in	its	new	republic.	That	is,	the	Enlightenment,	and	its	need	to	free	itself	from	the	bonds	of	religion,	law,	and	morality,	is	inherently	antithetical	to	the	values	of	a	republic	that	upholds	“the	state,	the	community,	[and]	the	common	good.”11	More	to	de	Sade’s	point,	no	Enlightened	man	is	truly	interested	in	relinquishing	his	proprietary	rights,	for	to	share	goods	and	live	by	one	law	would	simply	be	against	nature.	More	broadly,	to	abandon	the	rights	of	the	individual	is	to	defy	a	particular	order	that	nature	itself	inspires.			 Adorno	and	Horkheimer’s	Dialectic	suggests	that	de	Sade	illuminates	a	specific	organization	of	life	that	is	different,	albeit	familiar	to	us.	It	is	an	order	encouraged	by	the	individual	with	no	substantial	goal,	advancing	through	excessive	violence	and	motivated	by	a	will	to	dominate	everything—what	we	have	here,	as	Anahid	Nersessian	more	eloquently	puts	it,	is	the	“mass	idealization	of	the	unrestrained	and	inexhaustibly	available.”12			This	section	introduces	how	Enlightenment	philosophy,	in	its	trend	and	tendency	to	control	nature,	extends	to	and	includes	the	domination	of	women	and	female	sexuality.	It	acknowledges	women	as	both	symbolically	“natural”	bodies	and	socially	gendered	bodies.		By	focusing	on	the	turmoil	happening	within	man—as	compulsively	freeing	himself	from	authority	yet	uncontrollably	keeping	his	thumb	on	everything	else—I	am	able	to	think	
                                               11	“Republic,	n.”	OED.	
12 Anahid	Nersessian,	Utopia,	Limited,	12.	
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about	the	violent	ways	the	female	body	is	claimed	and	figured	as	a	resource	(whether	a	fruitful	one	or	not)	during	a	period	defined	by	“self-destruction”	and	“social	freedom.”13		In	order	to	think	about	how	women	are	symbolically	and	materially	claimed,	I	use	Adorno	and	Horkheimer’s	Dialectic	of	Enlightenment	in	order	to	press	harder	on	the	topic	of	social	domination:	What	does	it	mean	to	be	dominated?	How,	to	what	extent,	and	by	whom	is	violence	inflicted?	Is	there	any	possibility	to	be	liberated	from	or	within	this	process?	As	a	twentieth	century	text	published	in	the	wake	of	World	War	II,	Dialectic	is	largely	concerned	with	Enlightenment	philosophy	as	a	foundation	for	social	domination.	Particularly,	the	way	reason	develops	into	a	permission	to	not	just	dominate	but	exterminate	the	Jewish	population,	as	well	as	many	others.	More	central	to	my	project,	Adorno	and	Horkheimer	also	create	a	parallel	between	those	who	are	Jewish	and	those	who	are	women.	The	two	groups	are	joined	together	and	marked	as	those	who	are	intellectually	and	physically	inferior,	“bearing	the	brand	of	domination	on	[their]	forehead.”14			 In	order	to	delineate	a	connection	between	female	sexuality	and	the	compulsive	need	to	control	resources,	Dialectic	uses	Marquis	de	Sade	to	show	that	the	Enlightenment—in	its	relationship	to	women—becomes	preoccupied	by	what	women	represent.	De	Sade’s	works	are	exemplary	for	this	undertaking	because	they	often	operate	around	a	central	female	character.	In	this	position,	characters	such	as	Justine,	Juliette,	or	Eugénie	spew	ideas	about	libertinism,	its	philosophies	and	amoralities.	And	yet,	while	maintaining	her	central	location	in	the	narrative,	the	Sadeian	heroine	either	willingly	or	
                                               13	Horkheimer,	xiii.	
14 Horkheimer,	112.	
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unwillingly	is	subjected	to	a	flurry	of	violent	acts	against	her.	Soon,	she	is	physically	and	ideologically	overwhelmed	by	the	strength	of	the	male	characters	and	thus	consigned	to	her	position,	a	“representative	of	her	sex.”15	Throughout	de	Sade’s	oeuvre,	men	see	her	as	standing	for	nature,	as	something	to	be	relentlessly	subsumed	in	the	abstract,	and	subjected	in	the	real.16	The	woman,	as	socially	and	symbolically	inferior,	becomes	something	for	man	to	claim.		 	
                                               15	Horkheimer,	112.	
16	Horkheimer,	111.	
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Rochester,	Femininity,	and	Material	power	
	
But	mark	what	creatures	women	are:	
How	infinitely	vile,	when	fair!	
—John	Wilmot,	Earl	of	Rochester,	A	Ramble	in	St.	James’s	Park	
	Someone	Adorno	and	Horkheimer	do	not	address	but	who	is	nonetheless	an	important	predecessor	to	de	Sade	is	John	Wilmot,	the	Earl	of	Rochester.	Although	Rochester	favors	violent	language	over	violent	action,	I	trace	the	libertine	tradition	through	his	work	via	its	preoccupation	with	venereal	disease.	Moreover,	Rochester	offers	us	a	place	to	start	because	he	provides	us	an	intimate	assessment	of	action	that	we	see	more	macroscopically	in	de	Sade	and	Blake.				 In	his	book,	Actions	and	Objects,	Jonathan	Kramnick	probes	at	consciousness	and	where	it	fits	among	a	desire	to	claim	and	the	physical	action	of	claiming.	Desire	can	be	thought	of	as	a	motivating	thought,	a	spurring	that	comes	from	inside	the	body,	and	actions	fluidly	follow	through	on	these	impulses.	In	this	form,	desire	as	an	impulse	and	action	as	its	immediate	effect	is	an	image	found	everywhere	in	libertine	works.	Consciousness	interrupts	this	flux,	“coming	into	the	story	only	to	gum	up	the	machinery	of	the	physical	system.”17	In	keeping	with	Kramnick,	I	explore	Rochester	to	think	about	action	and	desire	as	a	physical	process	perfected	by	its	context	and	environment,	here,	images	of	matter	“[have]	no	need	of	a	mind	to	complete	its	causal	circuit.”18	
                                               17	Jonathan	Kramnick,	Actions	and	Objects,	113.	
18 Kramnick,	16;	144.	
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	 This	reading	gives	primacy	to	the	physical.	So,	while	sexuality	is	freed	from	the	fetters	of	religion,	society,	and	law,	it	is	no	more	than	an	elaborate	function	of	the	body,	an	action	unconsciously	followed	through	from	A	to	Z.	The	libertine	transforms	sexuality	into	a	material	thing,	dismembering	the	body	into	“pricks,”	“ballocks,”	and	“arses.”	Yet,	all	these	parts	are	enlisted	without	thought	into	the	flurry	of	the	physical	circuit.	For	Rochester,	what	is	sexually	desirable	is	indivisible	from	sexual	action.	“Sexuality”	is	defined	by	physicality,	by	its	uninhibited	engagement	between	body	parts	and	fluids,	always	active,	and	ideally	separate	from	consciousness.	In	departing	from	Kramnick,	I	think	about	how	context	and	environment	are	shaped	by	gendered	models	of	desire	and	action.	It	is	an	idea	I	elaborate	in	the	upcoming	section,	but	for	now	address	within	Kramnick’s	framework.	In	these	terms,	male	sexuality	is	permitted	a	fluidity	from	desire	to	action,	and	female	sexuality	is	contextualized	by	its	infinite	availability	and	constant	interaction	with	men.		The	ideal	environment	for	the	libertine	is	an	unconscious	surrendering	of	the	female	body	to	man’s	unconscious	sexual	desires.	Yet,	in	those	moments	when	we	see	the	glimmers	of	mental	faculties,	the	speaker	has	been	jolted	out	of	the	physical	circuit	by	the	foulness	of	the	female	body.	Consequently,	the	libertine	frames	the	filthiness	of	the	woman	as	an	offense	to	male	desire.		If	actions	are	perfected	by	context	and	environment,	the	vile	female	body	is	an	object	positioned	as	an	environmental	obstacle.		Rochester’s	poetic	form	offers	insight	into	sexuality	as	a	material	process	dependent	on	a	certain	form	of	environment.	Sexual	interactions	adopt	a	lyric	quality	that	appear	to	be	reliant	on	a	harmonic	and	natural	energy.		Of	course,	Rochester	is	satirizing	the	personal	by	giving	the	material	its	own	lyricism.	Nevertheless,	he	also	constructs	a	form	that	provides	a	rhythm	conducive	to	the	flow	from	desire	to	action:	
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While	I,	my	passion	to	pursue,		 Am	whole	nights	taking	in	The	lusty	juice	of	grapes,	take	you		 The	lusty	juice	of	men.19	The	lyrical	is	reserved	for	the	material.	Instead	of	a	union	made	by	love,	the	poem	gives	us	a	union	of	fluids;	a	passion	satisfied	by	action	rather	than	by	consciousness	or	sentiment.	The	multiplicity	of	“grapes”	parallels	the	“the	lusty	juice	of	men,”	consequently	characterizing	sexuality	by	its	boundless	physical	availability.	The	rake	consumes	as	much	of	the	material	as	passion	permits	and	never	skips	a	beat;	even	and	up	until	the	last	line	when	he	orders	the	female	body—“take	you”—as	a	carafe	for	the	bounty	of	men’s	passions.		Conversely,	the	female	body	can	also	foster	a	more	offensive	environment	that	is	less	lyrical.	Men,	even	a	bounty	of	men	and	their	passions,	have	no	part	in	defiling	the	sexual	environment.	Instead,	the	female	body	naturally	corrupts	the	atmosphere	and	requires	additional	“paper”	and	“spunges”	to	prepare	itself	to	interact	with	men.20	More	explicitly,	the	women	are	expected	to	be	consciously	aware	of	male	desire	and	action.	They	are	responsible	for	self-cleaning	which,	in	turn,	cleanses	the	environment	and	ensures	fluency	for	male	sexuality:	from	male	desire	to	male	action.	Women	must	surrender	their	own	physical	desires	and	actions	for	the	ease	of	men.	Without	female	consciousness,	the	female	body	corrodes	male	sexuality	by	“gumming	up	the	machine,”	disrupting	its	lyric	prosody:		My	spotless	flames	can	ne’er	decay	
                                               
19 Rochester,	“Song	(early	version),”	84.	21-24.	
20	Rochester,	“Song,”	139.7-8.	
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	 If	after	every	close,	My	smoking	prick	escape	the	fray	Without	a	bloody	nose.21	Here,	menstruation	chops	up	the	melodic	consistency	of	physical	action.	A	material	interruption	from	the	woman	who	should	have	consciously	and	actively	attended	to	herself	earlier	on.	And	yet,	this	dilemma	provides	a	new	way	to	read	the	female	form	as	materially	active	in	an	unsuspecting	way:	it	is	a	body	that	threatens	to	extinguish	the	heat	of	desire	by	committing	violence	against	the	virility	of	man,	by	giving	him	a	“bloody	nose.”	Consequently,	the	female	body	is	thought	to	be	not	just	inherently	filthy,	but	naturally	aggressive,	and	must	consciously	work	itself	into	submission	for	men.	That	is,	women	subdue	and	restrain	their	most	natural	and	active	qualities	by	consciously	conforming	to	male	models	of	desire	and	action.	More	specifically,	the	female	body	makes	itself	into	a	passive	one:	a	body	that	is	most	advantageous	contained	and	most	vile	when	disruptive.		Poems	such	as	this	one	show	how	the	active	and	filthy	female	body	become	inextricably	linked.	The	two	appear	at	once	and	become	an	important	way	to	think	about	how	women’s	sexuality	is	ideal	when	it	consciously	subdues	itself.	In	this	vein,	Rochester’s	figure	of	the	prostitute	is	female	sexuality	gone	awry,	an	example	of	the	unrestrained,	the	belligerent,	and	the	disobedient—a	defiant	object	disrupting	the	steady	machine	of	male	desire	and	action.	Rochester’s	poem	“On	Mrs.	Willis”	correlates	a	hypersexualized	harlot	to	active	contamination:	“She	rails	and	scolds	when	she	lies	down,	/	And	curses	when	she	spends.”22	Female	sexuality	uses	disease	to	act	out.	The	transferences	of	disease,	the	
                                               21	Rochester,	139.9-12.	
22	Rochester,	“On	Mrs.	Willis,”	137.15-16.		
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“curses	when	she	spends,”	are	not	simple	disruptions	but	lethal	and	aggressive	actions	made	by	the	female	body.		In	this	reading,	venereal	disease	is	a	complement	to	the	naturally	active	and	hostile	female	body.	The	diseased	woman	is	a	figure	uncontained	and	disobedient,	she	curses	and	leaves	men	bloody.	Her	diseased	body	is	most	threatening	because	it	foregoes	consciousness	and	cleanliness,	and	thus	naturally	resists	the	libertine’s	model	of	male	sexuality.	And	yet,	with	all	the	dissatisfaction	toward	women,	their	bodies,	and	their	natural	resistance	to	male	desire	and	action,	they	are	still	worth	the	pursuit:	“I’ll	change	a	mistress	till	I’m	dead—	/	And	fate	change	me	to	worms.”23		As	it	is	for	the	libertine,	disease	is	a	liability	for	the	active	female	body,	a	forced	foreclosure	of	female	consciousness,	a	waiver	of	the	possibility	to	contain	and	subdue	itself.		For	Rochester,	venereal	disease	is	threatening	because	it	means	that	women	may	no	longer—or	should	no	longer—surrender	themselves	to	the	desires	of	men.	Its	materiality	changes	the	environment,	and	thus	interrupts	the	flow	from	male	desire	to	male	action.	Disease	is	a	substance	proper	or	indigenous	to	the	female	body,	and	it	makes	it	permanently	unruly	and	unmanageable.	This	is	a	notion	de	Sade	draws	on	in	Philosophy	in	
the	Bedroom,	reframing	it	in	terms	even	more	explicitly	concerned	with	the	problems	of	personal	agency.			 Just	like	the	rake	who	cannot	control	the	active	materiality	of	the	female	body,	de	Sade	further	narrows	the	hope	for	any	form	of	autonomy.	Philosophy	illuminates	an	important	characteristic	of	disease,	that	is,	the	lack	of	agency	in	wielding	disease	as	well	as	containing	and	transferring	it.	The	individual	body	cannot	consciously	nor	autonomously	
                                               23	Rochester,	“Against	Constancy,”	82.19-20.	
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transfer	or	refuse	the	toxic	matter.	This	epidemiological	understanding	of	disease	shows	us	how	futile	the	efforts	are	of	the	individual	in	comparison	to	the	collective	possibility	of	the	natural.	The	organic	body,	in	its	collection	of	particles	and	configuration	of	matter,	possesses	a	power	that	the	individual	simply	does	not.			I	will	now	extend	Adorno	and	Horkheimer’s	reading	of	de	Sade	by	expanding	the	boundaries	of	violence	and	power	to	include,	not	just	women	under	the	control	of	men,	but	both	men	and	women	under	a	collective	power	of	venereal	disease.	I	believe	that	what	de	Sade	begins	to	address	through	whips	and	flogs	he	effectively	finishes	through	the	destructive	animation	of	disease.	I	hope	this	reading	will	show	how	the	Enlightenment	is	not	just	a	period	fueled	by	the	individual	will	to	dominate;	but	rather,	becomes	an	interrogation	of	individual	human	autonomy	in	light	of	the	powerful	collective	body.			Although	this	may	sound	like	I	am	trying	to	erase	all	of	the	violence	that	happens	to	the	women	in	de	Sade’s	works,	my	goal	is	not	align	the	author	with	feminism	nor	argue	that	he	has	an	earnest	concern	for	women	and	their	welfare.	Instead,	I	emphasize	that	de	Sade	uses	the	female	body	in	such	a	way	that	frames	it	as	“natural,”	and	thus	symbolic	of	a	collection	of	things:	a	collection	of	matter,	of	particles,	of	nerves.	Thus,	the	woman	in	de	Sade’s	works	is	not	simply	“the	representatives	of	her	sex”	as	I	have	pointed	out	before.	Quite	conversely,	she	is	the	representative	of	all	organic	things,	including	but	not	limited	to	her	sex.	The	period’s	misguided	position	toward	nature	runs	parallel	to	its	position	toward	women,	as	things	always	available	to	take.	My	next	section	breaks	down	Adorno	and	Horkheimer’s	classification	of	male	dominance	in	order	to	refashion	a	slightly	different	version	of	this	model	which	advances	disease	as	a	form	of	power	that	weaves	itself	in	and	out	of	bodies,	regardless	if	they	are	“male”	or	“female.”			
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To	begin	this	reconstruction,	we	must	first	understand	what	dominance	is	and	where	it	comes	from.	Domination	is	defined	by	a	divide:	between	one	who	has	authority	and	one	who	yields	to	authority.	In	order	to	maintain	control,	one	must	always	have	something	to	command.	Philosophy	in	the	Bedroom	offers	a	way	to	think	about	how	philosophy	not	only	divides	the	sexes	but	marks	this	division	as	crucial	for	organized	life.	In	the	final	dialogue	of	the	text,	the	group	continues	to	brutalize	the	body	of	Madame	de	Mistival	in	excessive	and	unorganized	ways.	Although	relentless	in	its	violence,	the	group	has	only	one	intention,	namely	that	she	remain	alive:	“The	suffering	must	increase	gradually	so	as	to	not	kill	her	off	beforetimes.”24	As	the	inferior	sex,	women	must	remain	alive	so	that	they	continue	to	be	the	subordinate	group	while	men	are	the	dominant.	In	the	dichotomy	of	nature	versus	civilization,	women	are	symbolic	of	nature	and	thus	weakness,	alienating	men	from	these	characteristics	and	isolating	them	in	a	position	of	strength.25	Men	are	cornered	by	what	they	cannot	be,	and	consequently	lash	out	against	it.	This	may	sound	as	though	men	have	a	desire	to	be	part	of	nature,	when	in	fact—they	fear	it.	Thus,	the	urge	to	dominate	is	a	desire	deeply	rooted	in	panic.				This	template	shows	how	fear	organizes	life	by	transforming	itself	into	an	action	that	inevitably	guarantees	men	a	position	of	strength	and	dominance.	More	simply,	“life”	is	organized	through	the	threat	of	nature,	and	civilization	maintains	its	position	of	dominance	through	nature’s	abuse.	That	is,	as	Adorno	and	Horkheimer	point	out,	the	“fear	and	weakness	[of	women],	the	greater	affinity	to	nature	which	perennial	oppression	produces	
                                               
24 De	Sade,	358.	
25	Horkheimer,	112.		
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in	them,	is	the	very	element	which	gives	them	life.”26	It	is	the	repressing	of	women	that	guarantees	how	and	for	what	reason	they	live,	while	also,	animating	the	metaphysics	of	life	through	the	natural	division	of	the	sexes.	As	we	saw	with	de	Mistival	earlier,	Marquis	De	Sade	uses	sexual	violence	to	personify	a	tireless	play	between	enervation	and	revival,	so	even	as	de	Mistival	is	fainting	from	the	sheer	violence,	Dolmancé	declares,	“We’ll	flog	her—that	should	restore	her	senses.”27		
Philosophy	shows	how	keeping	women	on	the	brink	of	life	is	vital	to	the	lives	of	men,	providing	a	notion	that	men	can	live	their	“life	to	the	full	only	in	the	collective.”28	Consequently,	there	is	something	jarring	about	the	potential	of	women,	as	“uncivilized”	and	thus	indirectly	threatening	to	men.	Perhaps,	more	importantly,	men’s	dependence	on	circumscribed	women	shapes	our	broader	human	existence.	To	think	about	this	less	abstractly,	for	men	to	take	full	advantage	of	their	dominant	position,	they	must	extinguish	the	arbitrary	constraints	that	restrict	them:	the	religion,	the	law,	and	social	morality.	Which	leads	us	to	ask,	how	can	men	continue	to	oppress	women	if	they’ve	destroyed	the	systems	that	are	instrumental	to	such	oppression?		Jane	Gallop’s	essay	“The	Liberated	Woman”	draws	connections	between	the	American	counterculture	movement	of	the	1960’s	and	what	she	calls	de	Sade’s	“liberated	woman.”	By	drawing	on	a	popular	critique	of	“free	love,”	Gallop	argues	that	the	movement’s	intention	to	revolutionize	the	sexual	expectations	of	women	only	freed	them	up	to	be	
                                               26	Horkheimer,	112. 
27	De	Sade,	359.	
28	Horkheimer,	112.	
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totally	available	to	men.	For	women,	knocking	down	the	constraints	of	wedlock	and	motherhood	inevitably	reconstructed	them	inside	male	desires	and	models.29	To	exemplify	this	model,	Gallop	uses	Philosophy	in	the	Bedroom	to	detail	the	subtle	ways	in	which	male	desire	hinders	any	true	female	sexual	abandonment.	By	using	her	own	personal	experience	as	a	reader,	Gallop	posits	that	it	is	easy	to	assume	that	the	women	in	
Philosophy	are	liberated	because	translations	of	the	text	have	failed	to	interpret	the	distinct	presumptions	about	gender	difference.	To	begin,	in	translating	the	text	from	La	Philosophie	
dans	le	boudoir	to	“philosophy	in	the	bedroom,”	the	English	translation	avoids	the	gendering	of	the	term	“boudoir.”	Indeed,	“boudoir”	is	defined	as	a	“woman’s	private	sitting	room,”	or	a	place	where	a	woman	may	“retire	to	be	alone.”30	In	its	definition,	the	place	suggests	a	special	freedom	from	men.	When	the	story	opens,	Madame	Saint	Ange	is	guiding	Eugénie	into	her	boudoir	where	they	are	certain	“no	one	shall	take	it	into	his	head	to	interrupt	[them].”31	Instead,	the	two	women	are	surprised	to	find	Dolmancé	already	waiting	in	an	armchair	to	interfere	with	their	lesson.	For	Gallop,	this	moment	is	emblematic	of	the	subtle	and	pervasive	ways	that	male	desire,	as	a	“philosophy,”	asserts	itself	in	the	moment	when	women	try	to	educate	other	women:	“The	entrance	of	philosophy	into	the	boudoir	is	thus	represented	as	male	penetration	into	female	space,	one	which	the	women	did	not	consent	to—but	which	they	very	quickly	accept	and	warm	to.”32	
                                               29	Jane	Gallop,	“The	Liberated	Woman,”	92.	
30 Gallop,	92;	“Boudoir,	n.”	OED. 
31 De	Sade,	195	(emphasis	added). 
32	Gallop,	94.		
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Although	I	agree	that	the	English	translation	is	missing	a	key	reference	to	the	gendering	of	the	text,	this	project	does	not	think	of	de	Sade	and	Philosophy	quite	in	the	same	way.	Gallop	has	noted	how	the	original	epigraph	of	the	text—"The	mother	will	prescribe	the	reading	of	this	to	her	daughter”—implies	that	de	Sade	intended	the	text	to	be	read	to	and	by	women.	That	is,	after	mothers	subscribe	to	the	philosophies	of	the	text,	they	would	then	educate	their	daughters	on	the	sexual	freedom	that	liberates	them	all.	This	communication	is	intended	to	be	relayed	from	woman	to	girl,	a	process	that	guarantees	the	male	model	of	the	sexually	liberated	woman	continues	to	be	passed	down.	The	book	becomes	part	of	a	pedagogical	process	that	generationally	shapes	women	as	always	sexually	available	to	men.	Although	I	agree	that	the	text	intends	to	teach,	I	think	the	epigraph	can	be	read	in	a	way	that	is	not	so	straightforward.	Beyond	the	female	audience,	I	think	that	those	Sadeian	invested	French	men	would	still	delight	in	the	fantasy	of	a	mother	educating	her	daughter	on	sexual	availability.	Which	means	that	the	intended	audience	could	plausibly	be	both	men	and	women,	both	of	whom	are	expected	to	learn	what	the	book	is	trying	to	instill.			Certainly,	the	political	content	of	Philosophy,	particularly	Dolmance’s	speech,	implies	that	de	Sade	was	less	keen	to	appeal	to	a	female	audience.	A	line	such	as	“never	may	there	be	granted	to	one	sex	the	legitimate	right	to	lay	monopolizing	hands	upon	the	other”	is	immediately	followed	by	its	direct	contradiction:	“a	woman	existing	in	the	purity	of	Nature’s	laws	cannot	allege,	as	justification	for	refusing	herself	to	someone	who	desires	her,	the	love	she	bears	for	another.”33	The	non-monopolized	woman	faces	the	expectation	that	she	remain	sexually	accessible.	And	yet	if	a	woman	refuses	such	access,	men	maintain	
                                               33	De	Sade,	318-319.		
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“the	right	to	force	from	her	this	enjoyment”.34	What	Dolmancé	calls	“temporary”	contradictions	are	rhetorically	integral	to	the	satiric	point	of	“Yet	Another	Effort,	Frenchmen.”	To	think	only	about	the	erotic	parts	of	the	work	is	to	miss	the	broader	point	that	the	work	intends	for	all	its	readers,	the	social	impossibility	of	a	pure	freedom	that	relies	on	force.		Like	Gallop,	I	agree	that	de	Sade	uses	women	as	a	device	to	illuminate	his	philosophy.	And	yet,	as	Adorno	and	Horkheimer	have	posed,	this	philosophy	is	motivated	by	something	broader	than	women	and	their	sexual	availability.	The	Oxford	Reference	defines	a	“boudoir”	as	a	“room	set	aside	for	the	lady	of	the	house	for	informal	activities	such	as	reading.”35	Perhaps	the	title	of	de	Sade’s	work	is	more	conceptually	rigorous	and	complex	than	we’ve	given	it	credit	for.	If	the	pornographic	content	is	intended	to	arouse	the	reader	in	the	privacy	of	his	or	her	own	bedroom,	perhaps	the	text	is	the	philosophy	in	our	
bedroom.	In	this	reading,	we	may	not	want	to	study	Dolmancé	as	the	symbol	of	“philosophy,”	nor	distinguish	the	erotic	from	the	political,	instead,	we	may	consider	how	the	two	forms	play	off	one	another.	As	I’ve	said	before,	a	large	part	of	“Yet	Another	Effort,	Frenchmen,”	focuses	on	how	men	treat	other	men	through	acts	of	murder,	calumny,	and	theft.	These	philosophical	issues	are	centered	around	men	as	individual	impulses	that	are	permitted	regardless	if	they	are	harmful	to	the	larger	social	body.	These	references	to	men	are	not	dilatory	tactics,	rather,	they	expose	a	form	of	thinking	that	is	as	preoccupied	by	class	and	other	social	positions	as	it	is	with	gender.	That	is,	the	political	is	vital	to	the	pornographic	for	it	betrays	a	broader	system	of	life	that	extends	beyond	organizations	of	
                                               
34 De	Sade,	319.	 
35	“Boudoir,	n.”	Oxford	Reference	Online.	
 28 
gender.	By	questioning	those	harmful	impulses	that	men	are	allowed	to	enact	against	other	men,	the	work	reveals	a	philosophy	where	gender	is	only	the	entry	into	an	oppression	much	more	absolute.		Similar	to	Gallop,	Beverley	Clack	offers	a	feminist	reading	of	Philosophy	and	female	sexual	violence.	Clack	proposes	that	de	Sade	saw	himself	as	“a	philosopher	whose	works	provided	a	dramatic	rendition	of	that	philosophy.”36	This	may	be	true.	Nevertheless,	as	Adorno	and	Horkheimer	point	out,	de	Sade	shares	his	own	form	of	thinking	while	pressing	on	the	trouble	of	unbridled	reasoning.	In	other	words,	de	Sade	is	not	simply	a	philosopher	discharging	ideas	about	sexual	liberty.	Instead,	he	is	a	French	citizen	cautioning	against	the	egoism	of	natural	philosophy:		 	 	 	Let	a	simple	philosopher	introduce	these	new	pupils	to	the	inscrutable	but	wonderful	sublimities	of	Nature;	let	him	prove	to	them	that	awareness	of	a	god,	often	highly	dangerous	to	men,	never	contributed	to	their	happiness,	and	that	they	will	not	be	happier	for	acknowledging	as	a	cause	of	what	they	do	not	understand,	something	they	well	understand	even	less;	that	it	is	far	less	essential	to	inquire	into	the	workings	of	Nature	than	to	enjoy	her	and	obey	her	laws;	that	these	laws	are	as	wise	as	they	are	simple;	that	they	are	written	in	the	hearts	of	all	men	and	that	it	is	but	necessary	to	interrogate	that	heart	to	discern	its	principles.37		This	Sadeian	universe	of	irony	and	contradiction	is	intended	to	interrogate	our	own,	to	question	the	natural	turned	cultural	assumption	that	“survival	of	the	fittest	.	.	.	in	practice,	means	survival	of	the	strongest.”38	Myopically,	nature’s	laws	are	simply	“written	in	the	hearts	of	all	men,”	and	no	other	form	of	collective	reasoning,	no	consideration	for	long	term	sustainability,	need	be	developed	or	obeyed.	Clack	points	out	how	de	Sade’s	works	are	in	
                                               36	Beverley	Clack,	“Violence	and	the	Maternal,”	275.		
37	De	Sade,	304.	
38	Clack,	275.	
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tune	with	this	picture	of	nature,	as	entropic	but	also	generative,	where	“through	destruction,	new	things	are	created.”		With	this	in	mind,	I	use	Dialectic	of	Enlightenment	to	think	about	the	implications	of	entropy,	that	is,	how	the	play	between	destruction	and	rebirth,	normally	dictated	by	nature,	is	increasingly	aggravated	by	men.	My	claim	is	that	the	“new	things”	created	in	this	process	of	reproduction	are	inevitably	slowed	by	a	philosophical	interference:	the	human	presumption	that	the	strongest	individual	is	permitted	to	all	things	natural	and	available.	Consequently,	when	men	interfere	with	the	natural	cycle	of	degeneration	and	renewal,	nature	is	no	longer	able	to	reproduce	at	the	speed	with	which	it	is	extirpated.			Clack	posits	that	theorists,	such	as	Roland	Barthes,	maintain	a	form	of	“irrealism”	toward	de	Sade	and	his	descriptions	of	sexual	violence.39	Yet,	I’d	like	to	reread	the	same	passage	from	Barthes’	Sade,	Fourier,	Loyola	to	examine	whether	or	not	Barthes	“ignores	the	extent	to	which	[de	Sade	offers]	exaggerated	forms	of	the	kind	of	abuse	to	be	found	in	actual	human	relationships,”40	or	perhaps,	just	frames	human	abuse	differently:		If	some	group	conceived	the	desire	to	realise	literally	one	of	the	orgies	Sade	describes	.	.	.	The	Sadian	[sic]	scene	would	quickly	be	seen	to	be	utterly	unreal:	the	complexity	of	the	combinations,	the	partners’	contortions,	the	potency	of	ejaculation,	and	the	victim’s	endurance	all	surpass	human	nature:	one	would	need	several	arms,	several	skins,	the	body	of	an	acrobat,	and	the	ability	to	achieve	orgasm	
ad	infinitum.41		Clack	argues	that	Barthes	is	distinguishing	between	the	idea	of	sexual	violence	and	its	action,	and	that	such	distinction	ignores	the	way	action	is	formed	through	ideas	and	
                                               39	Clack,	276.		
40	Ibid.	
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imagination.42	On	the	contrary,	it	is	the	very	idea	of	unsustainable	action,	supported	by	Barthes	and	illustrated	by	de	Sade,	that	directs	our	attention	to	a	more	significant	refusal	made	by	humanity.	Indeed,	de	Sade’s	picture	of	sexual	excess	utilizes	every	limb	and	orifice	in	the	room.	However,	this	abusing	of	bodies	exemplifies	the	snubbing	of	nature’s	limits	and	bounds,	that	is,	the	bedroom	becomes	a	place	where	real	material	things	are	exhausted	in	the	human	pursuit	of	the	illusory	and	infinitely	available.			Both	Gallop	and	Clack	offer	sociocultural	and	psychoanalytic	ways	of	reading	female	violence	in	de	Sade.	However,	this	paper	resituates	the	female	and	the	sexually	violent	within	the	material.	De	Sade’s	Philosophy	draws	us	into	the	bedroom	not	to	tell	us	but	to	show	us	a	philosophy.	He	forces	us	to	witness	how	the	imaginary	is	made	literal,	how	a	society	that	ignores	the	divisive	character	in	its	own	ideologies	must	eventually	answer	to	its	very	real	effects.			The	crux	between	Dialectic	of	Enlightenment	and	de	Sade	is	the	excess	of	violence	enacted	unto	women	and	the	way	these	acts	illuminate	the	period’s	brutal	efforts	toward	all	natural	things.	And	yet,	Adorno	and	Horkheimer	do	not	address	all	the	ways	that	de	Sade	uses	violence	to	characterize	man’s	ambition.	Venereal	disease	is	another	form	of	violence	that	men	wield	in	de	Sade,	and	yet	is	different	because	of	its	ontological	character.	Disease,	as	an	organic	form,	is	pushing	back	against	man,	refashioning	a	clean	order	of	dominance.	This	morbific	matter	is	a	form	of	correction,	not	just	of	men,	but	of	all	human	life.		 In	this	way,	the	material	is	detrimental	to	man’s	freedom.	The	specter	of	marriage	and	the	specter	of	disease	are	linked	in	the	way	they	determine	and	limit	how	men	
                                               42	Clack,	277.	
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organize	themselves	as	individuals	in	a	collective.	Both	marriage	and	disease	pose	a	threat	to	man’s	potential	as	a	figure	that	has	transcended	nature,	as	a	figure	who	has	earned	the	right	to	claim	and	acquire	things	unapologetically.		Let	us	return	for	a	moment	to	Philosophy	in	order	to	delineate	how	de	Sade	uses	marriage	to	create	a	model	for	the	loss	of	freedom.	According	to	Dolmance’s	monologue,	men	have	“no	right	to	bind	a	woman	to	[themselves]”	for	“the	exclusive	possession	of	a	woman	is	no	less	unjust	than	the	possession	of	slaves.”43	Marriage	is	prompted	by	acquisition,	by	a	self-interest	in	the	partner,	the	goods,	and	the	family.	Such	motivations	force	women—more	importantly,	men—into	unjust	attachments,	and	grant	one	sex	the	“legitimate	right	to	lay	monopolizing	hands	upon	the	other.”	Consequently,	these	notions	of	arbitrary	force,	possession,	and	claim	are	unnatural,	but	nonetheless	principal,	characteristics	of	marriage.		Throughout	“Yet	Another	Effort,	Frenchmen,”	Dolmancé	frames	marriage,	as	well	as	love,	as	a	form	of	privatization.	Love	is	at	the	heart	of	the	issue,	for	it	is	“Self-interest,	egoism	and	love	that	degraded	these	primitive	attitudes,	at	once	so	simple	and	so	natural.”44	Love	is	fundamentally	anti-republican	in	that	it	only	serves	the	happiness	of	two	people	as	opposed	to	the	happiness	of	everyone.45	What	should	be	demolished	is	not	simply	the	institution	of	marriage,	but	the	organization	of	people.	People	should	not	be	bound	together	in	any	sense	by	law	or	sentiment.	Thus,	to	order	couples	by	love	would	be	to	exclude	the	rest	of	society	from	taking	pleasure	in	certain	groups	of	people.		
                                               43	De	Sade,	318.	
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In	short,	organizing	society	through	marriage	or	love	is	detrimental	to	the	natural	freedom	that	men	assume.	The	republic	must	permit	the	exercise	of	impulses,	regardless	if	they	exceed	the	boundaries	of	what	has	been	socially	and	legally	established	as	morally	“good”	or	“bad.”	The	individual’s	desires	are	upheld	as	the	most	natural	right	in	that	they	allow	man	to	enact	his	full	potential.		Much	of	Dolmance’s	“Yet	Another	Effort,	Frenchman,”	focuses	on	issues	of	property	and	possession	with	marriage	acting	as	a	primary	fetter	to	man’s	potential.	Once	the	constraints	of	marriage	are	severed,	all	women	will	be	released	to	all	men.	This	natural	right	to	pursue	women	includes	the	right	to	force	sex	on	them,	as	one	woman	belongs	to	every	man.	The	right	“to	compel	their	submission,	not	exclusively,	for	I	should	then	be	contradicting	myself,	but	temporarily.”46	Of	course,	as	I’ve	pointed	out	before,	de	Sade	intentionally	undercuts	his	own	point	by	offering	one	sex	the	right	to	the	other	(as	long	as	it’s	only	a	little	bit).	This	grey	area	directs	us	to	a	larger	point:	no	man	wants	to	share	a	woman	with	other	men	regardless	if	it’s	his	natural	right	to	have	access	to	all	women	for	enjoyment.	As	Adorno	and	Horkheimer	show,	de	Sade	is	pressing	on	the	contradiction	between	common	right	and	the	right	of	the	most	powerful.	That	is,	all	men	may	have	claim	over	women	but	not	all	men	have	the	equal	right	to	claim.	And	what	motivates	man	to	pursue	nature,	science,	property,	and	women	is	the	egoism	that	defines	him	as	an	individual	rather	than	a	collective.	Yet,	paradoxically,	it	is	this	same	ambition	that	drives	a	particular	group	of	men,	characterized	by	their	sex,	race,	class,	and	nationality,	to	seek	total	domination	
                                               46	De	Sade,	319.	
 33 
against	all	others.	It	is	their	natural	right,	as	the	dominant	group,	to	maintain	a	position	toward	everyone	and	everything	as	infinitely	accessible	and	reserved	only	for	them.				 Commitments	to	this	form	of	power	manifest	in	the	wake	of	the	French	Revolution,	a	period	shaped	by	the	will	of	people.	De	Sade,	as	well	as	many	other	writers,	reveal	how	the	new	sociopolitical	tactics	of	organization	are	out	of	touch	as	they	are	myopic.	During	the	period,	the	French	and	the	British	governments	began	grappling	with	the	potential	of	a	republic,	of	a	society	that	cannot	rely	on	the	organization	of	an	aristocracy,	and	instead	must	find	new	ways	to	create	and	maintain	order.	The	threat	of	the	republic	shifts	the	sovereign's	focus	from	power	over	territory	to	power	over	its	own	population.	Power,	as	Michel	Foucault	argues,	“gave	itself	the	function	of	administering	life	.	.	.	it	is	over	life	that	power	establishes	its	domination.”47	Nearly	two	centuries	after	de	Sade,	Foucault	shows	us	how	authority	shifted	in	the	eighteenth	century	and	began	to	organize	in	ways	that	revolve	around	political	and	medical	power.	These	practices	produce	what	Foucault	names,	the	biopolitics	of	population	that	“[organize]	the	body	in	relation	to	reproduction.”48	Although	Foucault	addresses	biopolitics	as	a	form	of	power	shaped	by	social	and	medical	institutions,	I’d	like	to	think	about	the	ways	that	disease	becomes	its	own	form	of	power	that	threatens	the	way	the	social	can	be	ordered.	The	following	section	attends	to	disease	as	a	form	of	power	that	complicates	philosophical	tendencies	to	dominate	and	government	trends	of	surveillance.	Disease,	in	its	material	potential,	becomes	a	reminder	from	nature,	a	threat	to	arbitrary	forms	of	social	and	biological	control.	 	
                                               47		Carroll	Smith-Rosenburg,	“Bodies,”	25.	
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Venereal	Disease	as	Failed	Reproduction	and	Forced	Freedom	
	
Let	then	those	doctors,	who	love	to	play	with	shadows,	and	are	fond	of	pursuing	questions	
that	cannot	be	answer’d,	now	enquire	into	the	original	bulk,	figure,	and	disposition	of	the	
smallest	atoms	of	the	body	to	be	changed;	what	new	shape	they	ought	to	put	on,	in	order	to	
their	change;	by	what	force,	artifice,	and	mechanism	they	can	lay	aside	their	old	form	and	
assume	a	new.	—Jean	Astruc,	A	Treatise	of	the	Venereal	Disease	
	 At	the	end	of	Philosophy	in	the	Bedroom	there	is	a	climactic	moment	of	violence	when	Dolmancé	enlists	one	of	the	other	men	to	force	Eugénie’s	mother,	Madame	de	Mistival,	into	intercourse	and	instill	her	with	venereal	disease;	Dolmancé	declares,	“this	valet	has	one	of	the	loveliest	members	to	be	found	in	all	of	Nature;	however,	it	distills	disease,	for	‘tis	eaten	by	one	of	the	most	impressive	cases	of	syphillis.”49		The	valet	rapes	Eugénie’s	mother	in	order	to	transfer	the	disease	and	its	violent	long-term	effects	that	will	be	a	constant	reminder	to	her:	“so	long	as	this	cruel	disease’s	impressions	shall	last,	the	whore	will	remember	not	to	trouble	her	daughter	when	Eugénie	has	herself	fucked.”50	Dolmancé	addresses	the	valet’s	body	and	its	disease	as	part	of	nature	while	also	assuming	that	de	Mistival’s	body	will	remain	naturally	receptive	to	this	poison.	The	autonomy	in	this	scene	is	not	Dolmance’s	but	the	bodies’.	Dolmancé	is	merely	taking	advantage	of	the	way	organic	things	are	receptive	to	one	another,	group	themselves	together,	and	figure	themselves	into	new	forms.	My	point	being,	Dolmancé	cannot	will	the	disease	out	of	the	valet,	he	simply	sets	up	the	potential	for	contagion	and	then	lets	the	bodies	do	the	work.		
                                               49	Smith-Rosenberg,	25.	
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This	lack	of	agency	directs	us	to	a	new	question:	what	is	being	overlooked	in	the	pursuit	to	restructure	and	reorder	life?	And	yet,	in	typical	Sadeian	fashion,	we	are	not	afforded	the	time	to	mull	over	this	question	because	the	moment	is	not	over.	As	quickly	as	Dolmancé	summons	the	man	to	transfer	the	disease,	de	Mistival’s	daughter,	Eugénie,	agrees	to	sew	up	her	mother’s	vagina	to	prevent	“evaporation	[and]	leakage,”	so	the	disease	will	“more	promptly	cinder	[her]	bones.”51	The	goal	is	that	the	destructive	characteristic	of	syphilis	will	take	hold	of	the	body	internally	and	quicken	the	natural	corporeal	process	of	disintegration,	thus	effecting	disease’s	full	potential:		Eugenie—	Excellent	idea!	Quickly,	quickly,	fetch	me	needle	and	thread!.	.	.	Spread	your	thighs,	Mamma,	so	I	can	stitch	you	together—so	that	you’ll	give	me	no	more	little	brothers	and	sisters.52	In	sewing	up	her	mother’s	vagina,	Eugénie	is	manually	manipulating	and	degrading	the	site	of	reproduction.	She	is	interfering	with	nature	in	hopes	that	she	aggravates	and	sparks	its	most	destructive	qualities.	Yet,	her	enthusiasm	seems	amiss,	as	if	Eugénie	misunderstands	the	way	that	nature	is	pervasive	regardless	of	human	interference—or	perhaps	she	just	doesn’t	care.				This	scene	is	jarring	both	in	the	narrative	and	in	our	imaginations,	as	if	de	Sade	is	intentionally	and	forcefully	directing	our	eyes	to	what	society	is	failing	to	see.	The	sheer	excess	of	brutal	force	coerces	us	to	look	at	a	link	between	nature	and	failed	reproduction,	a	connection	that	shows	how	man	been	shortsighted	in	his	will	to	overtake	nature.	More	
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explicitly,	the	individual	who	inflicts	violence	upon	the	material	can	be	misguided	by	an	impulse	that	thwarts	the	cycle	of	natural	reproduction.		In	the	closing	scene,	de	Mistival	is	led	out	of	the	house	by	the	Chevalier,	while	we	as	readers	are	unsure	if	she	is	to	live	or	die.	The	image	becomes	emblematic	of	an	uncertainty	that	asks:	if	human	violence	overestimates	the	relationship	between	nature	and	reproduction,	how	does	reproduction	sustain	itself,	even	partially,	throughout	man’s	quest	to	dominate?	Although	I	doubt	this	question	can	be	found	in	de	Sade’s	works	as	excess	is	the	very	antithesis	of	sustainability,	I	will	now	turn	to	medical	treatises	in	order	to	think	about	the	subtle	ways	in	which	organic	bodies	persist	against	the	motivations	of	human	action.		
Disease	as	a	Biological	Determinant	The	epidemiology	of	disease,	that	is,	the	way	it	spreads	in	tireless	and	non-linear	ways,	is	a	way	to	think	about	disease	as	a	collective	power.	In	his	medical	treatise	on	venereal	disease,	French	physician	Jean	Astruc	notes	that	the	substance	of	disease	is	“produced	and	perpetuated	here	by	a	sort	of	morbifick	fewel.	.	.which	is	of	a	lasting	nature,	or	rather	is	constantly	renew’d.”53	The	sheer	endurance	of	this	matter	underwrites	disease	as	a	form	of	organic	power—a	power	defined	in	its	motion,	in	its	ability	to	animate	itself	and	animate	other	material	forms	regardless	and	in	excess	of	the	many	sites	it	contacts.	Consequently,	the	pervasive	characteristics	of	disease	shape	it	as	an	impermeable	form.	That	is,	a	ceaseless	form	that	will	animate	all	human	bodies	in	an	active	way	that	cannot	be	slowed	nor	fully	stopped.	
                                               53		Astruc,	xiii.	
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	 From	this	perspective,	disease	is	a	lively	and	energetic	matter,	clinging	at	random	to	different	bodies	at	different	times.	It	can	be	communicated	in	linear	ways:	between	man	and	woman	or	from	woman	to	infant.	Yet,	venereal	disease	is	not	exhausted	in	one	exchange	nor	can	it	be	traced	through	a	tidy	genealogy	of	recipients.	Like	the	libertine	ideal	of	spreading	seeds	to	whomever,	whenever,	disease	has	no	bounds.	One	of	the	few	differences	between	the	libertine	ideal	and	this	natural	matter	is	exactly	that,	one	is	illusory	and	the	other	is	real.	What	I	mean	here,	is	the	success	of	disease	is	unparalleled	regardless	of	an	ideal	pursuit,	the	more	people	who	are	in	sexual	contact	with	this	destructive	matter,	the	more	paths	disease	will	take.		Of	course,	the	rake	was	very	familiar	with	the	power	of	disease,	particularly	the	way	that	his	pursuit	is	inevitably	subsumed	by	his	material	reality.	In	Isaac	Cruikshank’s	satirical	poem,	“The	Dying	Rake’s	Soliloquy,”	syphilis	cannot	be	controlled	and	refuses	to	deteriorate.	In	fact,	soliloquizing	helps	imagine	how	the	body	succumbs	to	illness	even	when	the	body	is	separated—by	distance	and	time—from	its	initial	source.	Even	after	“appetites	pall’d,”	all	that	remains	is	disease:	When	my	health	and	my	fortune	to	riot	gave	way,		And	my	spirits	and	vigor	felt	total	decay	The	doctors	were	sent	for,	who	greedy	of	fees,	Engag’d	that	their	skill	should	remove	the	disease.54	The	dying	rake	is	comparing	his	own	inorganic	spirit	to	the	organism	of	disease.	When	his	body	and	money	are	spent,	venereal	disease	is	still	at	work.	Of	course,	the	poem	parallels	the	corrupt	rake	who	lives	out	his	passions	to	the	corrupt	physician	who	profits	off	
                                               54	Little	Isaac [Isaac	Cruikshank], “The Dying Rake’s Soliloquy,” 52. 
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passions’	effects.	However,	the	poem	also	offers	an	example	for	the	pure	energy	of	disease.	That	is,	the	way	that	this	sickness	cannot	be	attended	to	by	medicine	nor	the	body	itself:	My	carcase	was	sent	to	the	vultures	of	Bath.	When	drench’d	and	well	drain’d	by	the	faculty	there,	All	the	hope	that	remain’d	was	to	try	native	air.	The	humanly	form,	though	alive,	becomes	little	more	than	a	carcass:	a	lifeless	container	completely	devoid	of	ambition,	only	lit	up	internally	and	relocating	externally	because	of	disease.	Even	as	an	organic	substance,	there	is	no	way	to	slow	this	malady,	so	it	must	be	offered	to	the	wind	and	returned	to	its	own	physical	cycle.	This	allusion	to	the	grave	becomes	the	final	act	for	the	rake,	while	his	body	is	merely	a	rest	stop	for	the	infection.	That	said,	the	rake	does	not	simply	die,	he	succumbs	to	the	relentless	materiality	of	disease	that	effects	a	persistent	and	active	process	of	dying.	Even	after	he	is	gone,	the	physical	properties	of	disease	maintain	its	“spirit”	across	time,	place,	and	bodies.				 The	dying	rake	shows	us	how	disease	becomes	an	ideal	form	of	domination	because	it	works	continuously	and	independently	from	other	bodies.	In	other	words,	the	aggressive	characteristics	of	syphilis	will	inflict	the	same	harm	on	the	human	body	as	Dolmance’s	whips	and	flogs	but	do	not	require	continuous	wielding.			 As	a	biological	form,	disease	works	on	multiple	parts	of	the	body	to	“divide,	break,	and	dissolve	the	stamina	of	the	parts	it	falls	upon.”55	In	this	process,	the	ailment	works	to	breakdown	the	whole	form	by	depleting	the	energy	of	individual	parts.	For	instance,	in	de	Sade’s	text,	the	woman	may	be	dominated	by	a	blow	to	the	face	or	a	whip	to	the	back,	but	these	single	acts	of	violence	inflicted	on	separate	body	parts	are	distinct	from	venereal	
                                               
55 Astruc, 145. 
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disease	which,	in	one	transmission,	affects	“the	whole	mass	of	humours.”56	Nevertheless,	de	Sade’s	characters	continue	to	execute	acts	of	violence	with	a	ceaseless	and	tireless	energy	and	no	foreseeable	end.	The	only	intelligible	part	of	their	pursuit	is	the	will	to	dominate,	but	to	what	end?		The	excessive	cruelty	in	de	Sade	illuminates	a	particular	perspective	of	domination.	The	question:	“to	what	end”	becomes	the	very	point	of	the	text,	so	that	even	we	as	readers	become	tired	engaging	with	these	acts	over	and	over.	De	Sade	finds	unexpected	ways	to	remind	us	how	we	as	individuals	become	exhausted	while	the	violence	does	not.	But	one	thing	I	have	yet	to	address	is	how	the	hyper-sexualized	and	diseased	female	body	is	viewed	as	a	“collective”	body,	or	a	body	that	stands	in	for	all	others;	and,	more	importantly,	how	the	violence	of	disease	refashions	this	body	in	a	way	that	reassigns	power	from	the	individual	to	the	collective.			
Disease	as	a	Social	Determinant		 As	I’ve	said	before,	the	sexualized	and	diseased	woman	is	a	recurring	trope	in	eighteenth-century	discourse.	Culturally,	we	measure	female	sexuality	by	a	social,	cultural,	and	legal	value.	A	woman’s	chastity	assumes	a	certain	lineage	and	thus	guarantees	proprietary	rights	for	her	husband	and	family.	Because	of	this	process,	a	woman’s	sexuality	is	never	her	own,	but	is	instead	a	resource	bound	to	others	such	as	her	father,	husband,	and	children.	And	yet,	when	disease	intervenes,	it	combusts	all	of	the	neat	and	tidy	ways	the	state	has	organized	society	around	the	female	body.			To	be	diseased	is	to	be	unclean	and	thus	unfit	for	marriage	and	reproduction.	The	connection	between	the	sexualized	female	body	and	society	is	indivisible.	And	yet,	we	can	
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begin	to	think	about	this	connection	more	macroscopically,	as	Susan	Sontag	does	when	she	identifies	“a	link	between	imagining	disease	and	imagining	foreignness.”57	In	this	vein,	when	physicians	of	the	period	frame	venereal	disease	as	a	“morbifick fewel originally 
brought from abroad,”58 they are operating under a presumption that codifies the illness as 
foreign.  This	view	spurs	a	feeling	of	nationalism	by	pressing	on	the	failing	structures	of	intimate	life.	For	instance,	William	Hogarth’s	A	Harlot’s	Progress	famously	illustrates	the	demise	of	Moll	Hackabout,	a	country	girl	who	couldn’t	make	an	honest	living	in	London	and	thus	succumbs	to	a	life	of	harlotry.	Yet,	what	really	keeps	Moll	away	from	a	virtuous	life	is	more	specifically	gendered	than	just	the	city’s	corruption.	Moll	cannot	participate	in	the	required	“sexual	contract”59	that	underwrites	women’s	participation	in	not	just	intimate	life,	but	all	of	society;	she	cannot	participate,	that	is,	in	a	contract	that	legitimizes	the	female	position	by	“civilizing”	the	natural	woman.	In	Hogarth’s	engravings,	disease	manifests	itself	in	material	ways	by	spotting	and	scabbing	the	body	of	the	woman.	These	markings	of	disease	allude	to	a	body	whose	validity	has	been	spent,	a	woman	who	has	waived	her	right	to	the	sexual	contract	and	must	now	exist	outside	the	social	sphere.	To	society,	the	physiological	effects	of	disease,	the	signs	of	“corrupted	matter,”60	signify	an	other,	an	uncivilized	body	and	thus	a	person	who	occupies	a	vulnerable	social	position.	 
                                               57	Susan	Matthews,	“The	Impurity	of	Diction,”	71.	
58	Astruc,	xiii.	
59	Carole	Pateman,	The	Sexual	Contract,	11.	
60 Isaac	Francis	Nicholson,	The	Modern	Siphylis,	31.	
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	 What	is	worse	is	how	these	weakened	bodies	invite	further	acts	of	violence,	as	society	has	already	assumed	they	occupy	a	subordinate	space.	Moll	Hackabout	has	already	given	up	her	social	value,	so	symbolically,	she	has	no	legitimate	place	in	civilization.	She	has	relinquished	her	right	to	the	private	and	domestic	sphere	which	is	the	only	space	reserved	for	women	in	society.	In	this	way,	the	harlot	becomes	a	model	for	the	way	we	think	of	the	sexualized	woman	as	natural	and	uncivilized:	as	weak,	both	culturally	and	philosophically.	She	is	a	figure	that	permits	continuous	acts	of	domination	from	whomever,	whenever.			 Yet,	as	I’ve	already	pointed	out,	weakness	is	not	a	measure	of	physical	strength	so	much	as	it	is	a	social	position	that	women	occupy.	That	is,	weakness	cannot	be	measured	accurately	in	the	face	of	force.	In	The	Social	Contract,	Jean-Jacques	Rousseau	opens	the	section	“The	Right	of	the	Strongest”	by	noting,	“the	strongest	man	is	never	strong	enough	to	be	master	all	the	time,	unless	he	transforms	force	into	right	and	obedience	into	duty.”61	Thus,	the	“right”	of	the	strongest	is	characterized	in	its	ability	to	enforce	others	to	obey.	And	those	who	yield,	do	so	because	of	their	socially	weak	position,	not	because	of	weakness	itself:	“Force	is	a	physical	power	.	.	.	To	yield	to	force	is	an	act	of	necessity,	not	of	will.”62	Rousseau’s	example	of	power	is	that	which	makes	one	continuously	yield	to	force,	“after	all,	the	pistol	in	the	robber’s	hand	is	undoubtedly	a	power.”63	However,	a	pistol	implies	a	circumstantial	power	that	can	easily	be	violated	if	what	it	is	used	to	get,	can	be	concealed.	Indeed,	a	pistol	is	a	force,	but	power	itself	must	be	pervasive	and	inviolable.	Thus,	in	order	for	a	pistol	to	remain	a	power,	it	requires	participation	and	reinforcement	from	a	collective;	
                                               61	Jean-Jacques	Rousseau,	The	Social	Contract,	53.	
62	Rousseau,	52.	
63 Rousseau,	53.	
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it	depends	on	continuous	standing	and	brandishing,	until	the	pistol	becomes	a	symbol	of	its	systemic	power.			 But	who	is	part	of	this	collective	and	why	must	there	be	a	collective	at	all?	Paradoxically,	the	collective	relies	on	the	individual,	on	his	need	for	self-preservation:	Since	men	cannot	create	new	forces,	but	merely	combine	and	control	those	which	already	exist,	the	only	way	in	which	they	can	preserve	themselves	is	by	uniting	their	separate	powers	in	a	combination	strong	enough	to	overcome	any	resistance,	uniting	them	so	that	their	powers	are	directed	by	a	single	motive	and	act	in	concert.64		Rousseau	helps	delineate	how	men—as	not	just	leaders	of	the	republic	but	the	republic	itself—become	a	form	of	power.	In	addition	to	this,	in	the	separation	of	church	and	state,	men	become	the	only	legitimate	power.	Consequently,	women	will	yield	absolutely	to	the	power	of	the	republic,	as	the	“duty	of	obedience	is	owed	only	to	legitimate	powers.”65			 Of	course,	Rousseau	points	out	that	there	are	few	other	forms	of	legitimate	power	aside	from	the	republic,	as	legitimacy	itself	is	defined	by	the	state.	That	is,	the	social	body	determines	to	which	powers	we	yield:	“obey	those	in	power	.	.	.	All	power	comes	from	God,	I	agree;	but	so	does	every	disease,	and	no	one	forbids	us	to	summon	a	physician.”66	Yet,	what	Rousseau	seems	to	overlook	in	this	moment	is	the	physician's	ability	to	aid	every	disease.	How	can	disease	not	be	considered	a	form	of	legitimate	power	if	it	holds	the	potential	to	make	all	men	and	thus	the	republic	itself,	yield	to	its	force?		 That	being	said,	disease	is	unlike	any	other	form	of	power,	as	it	is	not	exclusive	to	men,	nor	women,	nor	any	other	living	thing.	The	organic	body	does	not	have	any	autonomy	
                                               64	Rousseau,	62.	
65	Rousseau,	53.	
66 Ibid.	
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over	the	way	it	yields	to	disease.	Disease	itself	dictates	how	it	will	live	and	move.	In	this	way,	neither	men	nor	women	have	any	true	autonomy	over	how	they	wield	this	power.	And	yet,	disease	unexpectedly	and	paradoxically	liberates	women	by	becoming	one	of	the	few	powers	they	can	actually	possess.	When	disease	is	communicated	to	the	body	of	the	woman,	it	still	lives	in	the	body	of	the	man	and	holds	potential	to	be	passed	to	the	body	of	a	different	man.	Unlike	whipping	and	flogging,	disease	offers	women	the	opportunity	to	strike	back.	Of	course,	this	is	a	shared	power	in	that	it	is	not	exclusive	to	women,	nor	do	women	alone	decide	how	they	communicate	this	power.	Instead,	they	must	answer	to	the	body.		 Obeying	the	body	becomes	a	way	to	think	about	how	disease	transforms	women,	from	a	site	of	power	to	a	vector	of	power.	Disease	becomes	a	woman’s	entry	into	a	more	egalitarian	society,	a	true	republic	where	power	is	shared	among	men	and	women.	A	collective	power	that	is	always	reinforced	by	the	body	itself:	“That	whoever	refused	to	obey	the	general	will	shall	be	constrained	to	do	so	by	the	whole	body,	which	means	nothing	other	than	that	he	shall	be	forced	to	be	free.”67	Disease	becomes	a	form	of	forced	freedom.	A	perverse	form	of	liberation,	a	chance	for	women	to	give	back	as	good	as	they’ve	had	it.	And	yet,	nonetheless,	still	at	the	cost	of	their	own	life.				 	
                                               67	Rousseau,	64. 
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Generational	Violence	in	Blake’s	“London”			
The	Eternal	Female	groand!	it	was	heard	over	all	the	Earth:	
—William	Blake,	The	Marriage	of	Heaven	and	Hell	
	Now	we’re	going	to	turn,	albeit	briefly,	to	William	Blake’s	“London.”	Although	this	poem	is	more	commonly	associated	with	institutional	corruption	and	human	suffering	following	the	French	Revolution,	my	hope	is	that	we	may	read	this	poem	differently,	as	a	product	of	the	libertine	tradition.	Unexpectedly,	Blake’s	work	is	an	alternative	to	answering	the	same	kinds	of	questions	I’ve	been	asking	throughout	this	project.	We	may	not	normally	associate	Blake	with	libertinism,	but	I	suggest	that	his	work	can	be	positioned	among	an	ongoing	libertine	tradition.	What	I	mean	here,	is	that	Blake	is	part	of	a	libertine	genealogy,	a	chain	of	male	reproduction	that	is	continuously	producing	a	poetics	of	the	body	that	is	organizing	around	sexuality	and	disease.	Here	is	the	poem:	
London	I	wander	thro’	each	chartered	street,	Near	where	the	chartered	Thames	does	flow.	And	mark	in	every	face	I	meet	Marks	of	weakness,	marks	of	woe.	 		In	every	cry	of	every	Man,	In	every	Infant’s	cry	of	fear,	In	every	voice,	in	every	ban,	The	mind-forg’d	manacles	I	hear—			
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	How	the	Chimney-sweper’s	cry	Every	black’ning	Church	appalls,	And	the	hapless	Soldier’s	sigh	Runs	in	blood	down	Palace	walls.	 		But	most	thro’	midnight	streets	I	hear	How	the	youthful	Harlot’s	curse	Blasts	the	new-born	Infant’s	tear	And	blights	with	plagues	the	Marriage	hearse.	 	There	is	a	trend	among	writers	such	as	Marquis	de	Sade,	John	Wilmot,	the	Earl	of	Rochester,	and	William	Blake	to	address	marriage	and	disease	as	a	detriment	to	men.	Blake	would	seem	to	be	the	outlier	among	the	three,	yet	he	fits	within	Adorno	and	Horkheimer’s	approximation	of	the	libertine,	as	one	who	“reveals	an	organization	of	life	as	a	whole	which	is	deprived	of	any	substantial	goal.”68	A	definition	of	libertinism	that	does	not	rely	on	pleasure	so	much	as	a	pursuit	to	organize.		Blake’s	works	are	another	reflection	of	the	period’s	tendency	to	use	female	sexuality	and	the	female	body	as	“methods	of	reproduction	of	the	subjugated	mass	society.”69		Blake	is	famous	for	his	complicated	relationship	to	social	and	corporeal	organization.	Tristanne	Connolly	suggests	that	Blake’s	art	is	preoccupied	by	images	of	birth	
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because	it	recognizes	the	limitations	of	physical	existence,70	an	infinite	organized	into	a	body.	That	is,	his	illustrations	press	on	how	the	body,	in	its	natural	processes,	restrains	and	determines	the	life	of	man.	Like	the	libertine	writers,	Blake	values	a	nonreproductive	sexuality,71	a	sexuality	of	abandonment	rather	than	organized	progress.	Of	course,	Rochester,	de	Sade,	and	Blake	are	quite	different	in	the	ways	they	attend	to	sexuality	and	female	reproduction,	specifically	in	the	way	they	address	the	literal	and	abstract	material	potential.	Yet	all	three	are	part	of	a	broader	tradition	that	expands	the	possibilities	of	sexuality	far	beyond	the	reaches	of	social,	legal,	and	moral	boundaries.	In	turning	to	the	poem,	I	begin	with	the	assumption	that	William	Blake’s	poem	“London,”	“insists	on	the	visibility	of	the	prostitute.”	Namely,	that	the	harlot	brings	to	the	surface	the	things	that	London	would	rather	forget.72	Although	I	agree	that	Blake	makes	the	harlot	central	to	the	poem,	she	does	not	bring	to	us	anything	that	may	be	visualized.	The	visibility	of	the	harlot	is	more	dependent	upon	our	hearing	her	than	our	seeing	her.	Lines	such	as	“In	every	voice,	in	every	ban,	/	The	mind-forg’d	manacles	I	hear—”73	communicates	suffering	through	sound.	The	cries	of	child	chimney	sweepers	mark	the	“blackning	Church”	while	the	sighs	from	soldiers	runs	in	blood	“down	palace	walls.”74	The	soldiers,	the	children,	and	the	harlot	are	merely	echoes,	distant	sounds	that	only	materialize	through	other	things.		
                                               70	Tristanne	Connolly,	Blake	and	the	Body,	xiii-xiv.	
71	Connolly,		xiv.	
72 Matthews,	73.	
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74	Blake,	41.10-12.	
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Nevertheless,	“London”	still	has	visually	stimulating	moments	that	thrust	us	into	the	streets	of	London	and	force	us	to	recognize	the	“Marks	of	weakness,	marks	of	woe.”75	The	signs	of	destruction	manifest	in	response	to	noise,	thus	it	is	intentional	that	we	hear	“the	youthful	Harlots	curse	/	Blasts	the	newborn	Infants	tear.”76	Namely,	that	the	violence	associated	with	the	“blast”	is	characterized	by	an	absence,	rather	than	a	presence.	The	corruption	of	London	is	brought	to	us	in	reverberations,	through	a	loss	or	limited	visibility.			This	London	is	not	organized	in	any	real	intelligible	way,	it	is	a	cacophony	of	sounds,	a	material	and	temporal	mess.	Connolly	points	out	that	the	mystical	qualities	of	Blake’s	work	are	“metaphor	from	material	existence.”77	Blake’s	artistic	tendency	to	play	with	the	natural	and	the	abstract	transfers	seamlessly	to	his	poetic	form.	If	the	“exterior	should	reflect	the	interior	more	literally,”	then	the	violent	internal	energy	of	disease	would	explode	in	tears	from	the	infant’s	eyes.	Sentiment	and	passion	do	not	betray	life	quite	like	the	physical:	“the	very	lifeblood	should	be	seen	in	the	limbs.”78	In	keeping	with	this	assumption	of	metaphorical	existence,	the	harlot’s	external	absence	becomes	an	effect	of	the	internal	work	of	disease.	Disease	works	to	erase	the	harlot,	to	move	her	to	the	margins	of	the	poem,	so	all	that	is	left	of	her	is	resonance.	In	these	terms,	the	echoes	of	her	curse	offer	a	metaphor	for	her	material	existence.	For	the	ways	in	which	disease	works	tirelessly	to	cinder	her	bones,	to	corrode	her	humours,	to	disorganize	
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the	female	body	from	the	inside	to	the	outside	until	we	hear	only	the	residual	sounds	of	her	material	existence.		This	way	of	imagining	violence	is	consistent	throughout	“London”.	This	process	connects	the	children,	the	soldiers,	and	the	harlot	by	a	broader	form	of	violence	that	affects	society	as	a	whole.	That	is,	the	poem	relies	on	the	physical	residue	of	ash,	blood,	and	tears	to	signify	an	interconnected	destruction.	The	harlot	cannot	participate	in	the	visual	sensation	of	Blake’s	poem	because	she	has	already	been	dissolved,	materially	annihilated.			Blake’s	mystical	works,	such	as	The	First	Book	of	Urizen	and	The	Book	of	Ahania	are	exemplary	in	thinking	about	how	the	body	is	defined	by	nature:	“shapes	screaming	flutter’d	vain/	Some	combin’d	into	muscles	&	glands	/	Some	organs	for	craving	and	lust.”79	Figures	may	be	“barr’d	and	petrify’d	against	the	infinite,”	80	however,	the	material	body	is	determined	in	these	restraints,	in	the	way	it	organizes	itself	through	nature’s	pursuit.	But	the	material	is	not	organized	in	“London,”	it	is	sprawling	itself	all	over	the	buildings,	dripping	down	the	walls,	leaving	the	borders	of	the	body.	It’s	as	if	nature’s	pursuit	has	finally	yielded	to	the	pursuit	of	the	individual,	the	pursuit	of	the	church,	state,	and	humanity	more	broadly.			The	infant	of	“London”	provides	a	way	to	imagine	the	exhausted	corporeality	of	nature.	The	infant	is	born	into	a	similar	universe	as	Urizen	and	Ahania,	although	admittedly	not	quite	as	supernatural,	a	universe	that	organizes	without	any	substantial	goals.	Yet,	the	infant	cannot	be	placed	socially	for	his	mother	is	gone,	and	cannot	contain	himself	materially	for	he	is	bursting	with	tears	and	disease.	Such	disorganization	posits	him	as	
                                               
79	Blake,	“The	Book	of	Ahania,”	4.31-33.	
80	Blake,	”Europe,”	10.15.	
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unformed,	both	socially	and	materially.	This	unformation	produces	echoes	that	direct	our	attention	to	something	lost	while,	at	the	same	time,	alludes	to	more	violence	to	come.		“London”	is	a	space	where	the	individual	has	pulled	forward	from	the	collective	and	the	natural,	and	thus	has	overestimated	its	own	power.	The	signs	of	human	egoism	manifest	as	material	cast-off,	as	bloody	and	ashy	excess.	The	poem	does	not	simply	provide	sociopolitical	commentary,	but	prophecies	a	broader	crisis	to	come.	It	has	us	looking	for	physical	signs	of	the	harlot,	but	only	gives	us	the	sound	of	her	absence	vibrating	from	the	margins	of	the	poem.	These	echoes	become	the	sounds	of	dissonance,	of	a	society	complicit	in	the	generational	transference	of	violence.		Blake’s	“London”	makes	an	inference	to	the	material	that	has	much	more	in	common	with	Rochester	and	de	Sade	than	one	might	expect.	This	libertine	lineage	is	rooted	in	the	relentless	disorganization	of	power	in	the	physical	world.	These	works	orient	themselves	through	sexuality	and	violence,	developing	their	ideas	through	material	consumption,	resistance,	and	finally,	annulment.	The	works	of	Rochester,	de	Sade,	and	Blake	are	pressing	on	the	continuous	straining	of	the	collective	material	body,	a	body	corrupted	by	a	pursuit	so	unnatural	that	it	finally	yields	itself	to	the	margins,	giving	itself	away	to	man.	
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Conclusion	This	project	began	as	an	attempt	to	redeem	the	sexualized	woman	of	the	eighteenth-century.	Instead,	it	has	stumbled	through	what	I	like	to	think	of	as	an	anti-redemption.	I	did	not	intend	to	frame	disease	as	a	profound	and	vital	form	nor	do	I	deny	that	most	forms	of	malady	are	often,	and	rightfully,	thought	to	be	destructive	to	life.	But	what	I’ve	found	is	that	these	destructive	characteristics	of	disease	offer	vindication	for	the	collective	body,	a	chance	for	nature	to	push	back	against	the	atomized	existence	of	the	individual.			I’d	like	to	return	for	a	moment	to	my	very	initial	question:	what	does	it	mean	to	be	the	vector	of	disease?	To	embody	the	metaphysical	in	one	material	form?	This	project	has	posited	disease	as	a	form	of	collective	power,	for	its	dependence	upon	numerous	particles	for	formation,	for	its	commitment	to	reproducing	itself	again	and	again	in	its	contact	with	multiple	bodies,	and	for	the	way	it	persists	past	the	individual’s	existence.		Unexpectedly,	disease	offers	a	thread	with	which	we	stitch	together	not	just	the	social	body,	but	the	broader	body	of	life.	Life	is	texturized	by	the	material	human	body,	and	it	is	disease	that	helps	weave	an	organic	fabric	of	particles,	flesh,	and	sores.	This	visual	form	continues	to	move	itself	across	time	and	space,	shaping	itself	through	a	shared	narrative,	as	colorful	and	material	as	any	tapestry.				 	
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